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THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SOCIAL STUDIES
1
One of the principal objectives of social studies should be to produce social
scientists or, to use Dean Harno's term, social engineers. Not that there is no
need of specialists who are exclusively economists, sociologists, political scientists,
psychologists, philosophers and lawyers. There are many problems within each social
science field to be solved, and education in that field no doubt qualifies a person
to handle the problems of that field. But with the increasing complexity of society,
there is an increasing number of problems that run across several or all of the
social sciences, and a specialist in one field only, is not competent to solve them.
Frequently, a specialist in one branch of the social sciences is not sufficiently
conversant with the other branches to be able to work in collaboration with special-
ists in those other branches. Such a specialist frequently is even intolerant, not
to say suspicious, of his fellow-specialists in the other fields. I used to think
that this shortcoming was limited to the lawyer, but I believe the same mistrust
is found in some economists, political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists.
There is a tendency for each to look upon his own discipline as offering the only
valid approach to social problems. Other branches are regarded as more or less
adventitious
.
In any discussion of complex social problems there is the point of view of the
economist, the sociologist, the political scientist, the psychologist, the lawyer,
but seldom the point of view of the social scientist. I suppose the nearest to
this point of view is the philosopher's, but the philosopher's function is to make
problems comprehensible, not to solve them. A social scientist is one who not
merely understands social science but who is disciplined in the techniques of the
social sciences*
Many of you have recently taken part in discussions of post-war reconstruction.
Have you noticed that the economist has one approach to the maintenance of peace, the
political scientist another, the sociologist another, the psychologist still another?
Who among us is competent to evaluate each proposal intrinsically and relatively
with reference to the goal we seek?
An illustration of a problem (or set of problems) requiring the attention of a
social scientist is that of the relationship of management and labor. In the first
place, there is involved a contract between employer and employee. A contract is
a legal relationship. Requirements for a valid contract and the effects of agreement
are determined by the common law. The extent to which government can require the
inclusion or exclusion of certain terms in this contract is a mixed problem of law
and political science. The setting up of a board with regulatory powers over labor
and management, and the functioning of such a board are again a mixture of law and
political science. The ownership of the physical plant, its equipment and its
good will and the incidents of this ownership are matters determined by the rules of
the common law of property. Interference with and regulation of this ownership
introduces questions of Constitutional law and political science.
But the problem of management and labor goes much deeper. There are the ques-
tions of a fair wage, a reasonable profit, accumulation of surplus, expansion of
production, security of employment. These are economic questions. Then there are
the problems of health, housing, recreation, pensions, unemployment insurance.
These are mixed economic and sociological questions. And through all these run
problems of individual adjustment and personality — mixed problems of psychology
and sociology.
What should be the training of men preparing to deal with these questions
either as representatives of particular interests, investigators, or as officers and
members of Boards having the responsibility of making and enforcing decisions?
Should they not be men who can view the entire picture? Should they not be aen
able to evaluate the economic, sociological, political and legal factors separately
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and in combination? Not that they must "be experts in each social discipline, but
they should know its technique, its terminology, and how to handle and comprehend
its data.
As to legal knowledge, for example, it would not be sufficient that an adminis-
trator of labor relations have knowledge only of labor law. He should have knowledge
of legal technique and terminology. He should know the importance of and how to
determine issues in cases. He should know the difference between decision and
dicta, the importance of the requirements of a fair trial, how to evaluate precedent,
when to apply strict and when liberal rules of construction, how to balance rigidity
against flexibility in the interpretation of rules. I leave to persons better
qualified, to say what the desiderata for a labor administrator should be in the
other branches of the social sciences.
Another example of a problem cutting across the field of the social sciences
is that of monopoly and combinations in restraint of trade. Others are resale
price maintenance transactions, what are fair and unfair methods of competition,
bankruptcies, security transactions, taxation, insurance and social security, bonding
and financial transactions, crime and Juvenile delinquency. Most of the questions
which come before our numerous state and federal agencies and bureaus present a
combination of legal, political, economic, and social problems. Especially is this
true of the cases before the Federal Trade Commission, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Labor Relations Board, Tennessee Valley Authority, Federal Communica-
tions Commission, Public Utilities Commission, etc. Should not administrators be
social scientists? It is perhaps not so much the making of investigations of social
evils or oven the drafting of corrective statutes or rules, that requires a compre-
hensive understanding, as it is the administration of remedies. It is at this point
that the social scientist is most needed.
And what about the jurist? The traditional attitude of lawyers has been to
look upon law as something of a closed system — as a system impervious to the impact
of moral, social and economic forces. The lawyer of a generation ago could say and
probably did say, "That may be bad economics or bad ethics but it is good law."
This attitude made the law slow to adjust to changed conditions and sometimes
completely unable to cope with them. Despite this attitude, however, the law was
not wholly or even materially bad. Even within its shell, principally because many
generations of wise and able men were its devotees, it developed techniques and
procedures and equitable principles that may well be the envy of other social dis-
ciplines. But law was not wholly shelled in. If social or economic policy was not
admitted openly by the front door, it came in secretly through the back door.
Occasionally a bold judge would, with premeditated malice, swing open the door in
broad daylight to other mistresses than the law. So, though the law was boastfully
proclaimed as the "perfection of reason" and as completely uninfluenced by extra-
legal factors, it must be said to its credit that it was not.
Holmes, with his keen philosophic insight, was the first to show the fallacy of
the traditional conception. But the real turning point came in 1908 when Louis D.
Brandeis, later Mr. Justice Brandeis, filed a brief for the State of Oregon in the
U.S. Supreme Court case of Muller v. Oregon. This case involved the constitutionality
of a law prohibiting the employment of women for more than 10 hours per day. The
Brandeis brief analyzed the reports of 90 different committees, bureaus, commis-
sioners, and factory inspectors, both in America and Europe, on the economic and
social undesirability of women working in factories more than 10 hours per day.
When Brandeis later became Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court he followed
the practice of incorporating social and economic studies in his opinions. The
Brandeis innovation was followed by Stone, Hughes, Cardozo, Black, Douglas,
Frankfurter and other judges of note. Every volume of opinions that now comes from
the Supreme Court contains at least some cases documented with extra-legal material.
•.
.
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So the law is no longer recognized as a closed system, but rather as that
"branch of learning which integrates all the social sciences . Should not the jurist
be a social scientist rather than a mere lawyer?
If one of the functions of social studies is to produce social scientists,
there should be a social science curriculum which seeks to turn out men who are
trained in the scientific method of examining historical, social and economic data,
who are able to organize, classify and compile statistical material, construct and
interpret tables, graphs and charts, and make deductions and generalizations from
them, and who must have sufficient imagination to devise plans for social improve-
ments, — men who know how national, state and local governments function, and the
part that politics and political parties play in the democratic process, who are
familiar with the scope and operation of constitutions, statutes, and the common
law, and who have a knowledge of the basic problems of administration.
George V. Goble
When one attempts to define the objectives of any field of school or university
study in the United States, he may use either of two approaches. He may define
the field from the standpoint of its subject matter, indicating the nature and
resources of its content and the types of data with which it deals. He will then
define objectives in terms of the progressive mastery of sequential units of subject
matter. Or he may describe the discipline functionally, showing how it is necessary
or desirable that youth should receive training in it, for the sake of their develop-
ment as individuals or as citizens in our democracy. With this approach, objectives
will be stated in terms of the ways in which students will use the training they
have received in the attainment of worthy ends.
The first approach might be used successfully in such a field as mathematics
in which there is a high measure of agreement among scholars with respect to the
limits of content at elementary levels and in which there is a recognized sequence
in subject matter. But when one attempts this first approach with the social
sciences, he is at once appalled at the breadth and depth of the field. To quote
from the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Commission on the Social Studies
of the American Historical Society, "The Social Sciences take as their province
the entire range of human history, from the earliest times down to the latest moment,
and the widest reaches of contemporary society from the life and customs of the most
remote peoples to the social practices and cultural possessions of the immediate
neighborhood. The social sciences thus embrace the traditional disciplines which
are concerned directly with man and society, including history, economics, politics,
sociology, geography, anthropology and psychology."!
1 Commission on the Social Studies of the American Historical Society. Conclusions
and Recommendations, pp. 6-7.
If the substance of this quotation be accepted, it is obvious that the curriculum
maker in the social sciences faces a formidable task. No one teacher can be expected
to encompass in his scholarly background the entire range of the field. Nor can any
one student, however many courses in the social sciences he may take in his college
or university career, be expected to be well trained in all its branches. As Beard
puts it, "Such is the unity of all things that the first sentence on instruction
in the social studies in the schools strikes into a seamless web too large for any
human eye . "2
2 .Beard, Charles A. A Charter for the Social Sciences, p. 1.
'•
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The social sciences present difficulties to the curriculum maker not only because
of their breadth and inclusiveness, but also because of the unsequential character
of much of their subject matter. No one can study calculus without a knowledge of
algebra. No one can learn the mysteries of advanced organic chemistry without a
background knowledge of the elements of chemistry. But the social sciences in general
and many of the individual disciplines in particular are lacking in this rigidity of
sequence in their content.
A subject like mathematics may be thought of as an inverted cone. Although human
knowledge may increase indefinitely the length of the cone and its circumference at
the expanding base,, the point of the apex on which it rests represents a necessary
starting point, and the section of the cone close to the apex consists of an irreduc-
ible minimum of basic material accepted by all scholars in the field.
Both the social sciences as a whole and at least most of the disciplines which
are grouped under that classification may be represented far more truthfully as
spheres than as cones. There are no apexes; no starting points indisputably determined
by the nature of the content. The fact that coincidence of subject matter is not
characteristic of content in beginning textbooks in such a subject as geography, or
sociology, or psychology, or economics is sufficient evidence on this point.
In what I have just said I do not mean to imply that there is no such thing as
sequence or consecutiveness in the social sciences or in their several disciplines.
One cannot read and understand an isothermal map unless he is versed in the interpre-
tation of map symbolism. But such sequences are found only with respect to various
aspects of the subjects and are not basic to the arrangement of the content as a
whole. Thus we may speak of sequences in the social sciences but not of a sequence. .
In attempting to arrive, therefore, at a statement of objectives in the social
scienoes which will be of value to the curriculum maker in the field, we must dis-
pense with any hope that mastery of the field as a whole can be considered one of
the objectives. Moreover we cannot include in our objectives the mastery even of
a certain section of the field, because due to its nonsequential character, there is
no agreement among all scholars with respect to what the minimum essentials are.
In this situation universities have tended to express the objectives of social
science study quantitatively.
. To put the matter very baldly, the implication of
our procedures is that the objective of majoring in the social sciences or in any
one of them is to have an amount of knowledge represented by successfully passing
examinations in a heterogeneous group of courses totaling a certain number of semester
hours. For the non-major in the field the objectives of instruction implicit in our
curricular procedures are to give a student as much information as is necessary
successfully to pass one basic course, and as much more information as he may be
willing to acquire by taking any courses he pleases, regardless of aim or sequence.
It seems to me that the way out of the dilemma I have sketched is to seek direc-
tion through the adoption of the second approach mentioned in the first paragraph
of this paper, namely, that of describing the social sciences functionally. If we
can determine what the social sciences should enable a student to do, we can arrive
at some conclusions as to the objectives of studying them.
This question would have been far easier to answer in an earlier period in the
history of American universities. There was a time when undergraduates were a
relatively homogeneous group; the great majority of them were preparing to enter the
professions; law, medicine, scholarly research and teaching, or the ministry. That
day is long past; heterogeneity of purpose has replaced homogeneity. Although at
the present time any effort to classify the life purposes of college students is
open to criticism and disagreement, yet I shall be so bold as to offer a classifica-
tion which I believe will be useful in answering our problem of determining the
objectives of studying the social sciences.
••
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The classification I am proposing has two groups. In the first group are those
who expect to make their life work scholarly research and university teaching in some
branch of the social sciences. They need as thorough a basic training as can be
given them in the time available, in one of the disciplines composing the social
science group, with some collateral training in one or more of the others. This
training should include not only the acquisition of subject matter but also experience
with the meaning and methods of research. Their undergraduate careers should be
thought of as the first step toward the Ph.D. degree.
In the other group I would classify all the remainder of college students.
They all have this in common: whether they will be business men, engineers, pro-
fessional men or agriculturists, they will use the subject matter of the social
studies as citizens and voters, not as research workers. With the members of this
group, the objective of teaching in the social studies is to make them into intelli-
gent, informed, thoughtful citizens, able and willing to bear their responsibilities
as college graduates in the social, cultural and civic life in their communities.
In attaining this objective, the curriculum maker in the social studies is
confronted with two basic problems. The first is selection of material. As has
been previously indicated, the field of the social sciences is so broad that selec-
tion is necessary even for the prospective research student; it is even more important
for the second group of students because there is little prospect that they will be
able to supplement any deficiencies in their formal undergraduate courses either by
wide reading in the field or by graduate work. The university should face this
problem squarely first by studying the content of the social studies in the light
of its effectiveness in the general preparation of citizens and second in arranging
suitable portions of this content in defensible sequences of courses.
The second problem of the curriculum maker is that of synthesis. Instructors
tend to present the content of a course as a unit,making little attempt to show its
relationship to the content of other courses even in the field of the same discipline.
While this is natural and to a certain degree desirable since it prevents undue
overlapping of courses, it leaves to the student the responsibility of working out
in his own mind a synthesis of his social science courses in such a way that he
gets a unified view of the contemporary national and world scene. I believe it is
safe to say that few undergraduate students are capable of making this synthesis
and still fewer will take the trouble to do it.
It is my opinion, therefore, that the university should plan and present certain
courses, the purpose of which would be to assist students to analyze some of the
fundamental problems facing our nation and world. These courses would transcend the
boundaries between the various disciplines included in the social sciences, and would
draw in their subject matter from several of them. The efforts of the instructors
in these courses would not be to present logically organized areas of the social
sciences, but rather to give students practice in synthesizing the materials they
have studied, through brining it to bear on the solution of important civic problems.
For example, an intelligent answer to the questions, Do we want some sort of organi-
zation of nations after this war, and, If so, what kind of organization should it be?
requires that one apply both knowledge and standards of values obtained from the fields
of history, geography, economics, political science, sociology, psychology and
education. Students whose training has been only in separate courses in these fields
and who have had little practice in synthesizing the data and values from them,would
tend, in my opinion, to answer the above questions rather in terms of their prejudices
or of their immediate reactions than in terms of a considered study of the basic
factors involved.
When in the student's undergraduate career these courses which offer practice
in synthesis should be required, whether at the beginning, somewhere in the middle,
or at the end I am not prepared to say. I am inclined to believe that they should be
.:'
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scattered throughout hia four years of study. I am convinced that there should be
enough of them to give a student a large amount of practice in the kind of thinking
they would require. And I am equally convinced that only through the provision of
such courses can the university discharge its full responsibility of giving to its
students those unified insights into contemporary life and problems without which
learning in the social sciences is relatively impotent.
E. H. Reeder
The primary objective of every science is its own systematic development. For
every science which deals with empirical reality, this means the progressive dis-
covery and the logical organization of theoretically valid knowledge concerning the
order of relationships between a specific category of data, methodically selected
and abstracted from the illimited variety and complexity of human experience.
In this sense, every social science has a distinct primary objective of its own;
and at the present stage of the development of these sciences they can have no common
primary objective which they can even tentatively approach. None of these sciences
has reached within its own limits a level of methodical selection, abstraction and
systematization comparable to that of general biology, not to speak of physics. Try
to organize into an approximately coherent system the problems and results of behavior-
istic psychology, Gestalt psychology, and Freudian psychology, not to mention the
older, but not forgotten, schools. Try to combine into a logically consistent science
the sociological theories of the French school, of Wiese -Becker, of Maclver, and of
Lundberg. Let lawyers attempt to unify coherently the theories of law of Duguit,
Davy, Stammler, Boscoe Pound, Morris Cohen, and Llewellyn. Systematize the economic
theories underlying those seventeen or so different explanations of "the depression"
which have been advanced during the last decade. Let educators harmonize the theories
of the educational process of Paulsen, Durkheim, John Dewey, and President Hutchins
.
No doubt, each of these sciences has a valid and coherent knowledge which serves
as common center of these divergent theories. But so long as the inner unity of each
is only a distant goal, a theoretic synthesis of all of them is an impossibility.
This is clearly demonstrated by the history of sociology, whose original ambition
was precisely to achieve such a synthesis. Even though the majority of sociologists
have by now resigned this ambition and are actually engaged in building sociology
as a special science, a minority still follow the nineteenth-century pattern. Any
one who wishes to sample their results should read carefully the textbook called
"Sociology" by Ogburn and Nimkoff and try to reconstruct its logical order.
Philosophy of history and, on a smaller scale, anthropology furnish additional
proofs that a theoretic unification of the social sciences is as yet only a dream,
not an objective. For instance, in Sorokin's Social and Cultural Dynamics , the major
methodological premises are probably the soundest any philosopher of history has ever
devised; yet his conclusions are as arbitrary and subjective as those of St. Augustine
or of Spengler. Lest any one should cherish the illusion that it is possible to
synthetize rationally the results of various sciences, at least when they draw their
data from the cultural life of one particular society, let me refer you to the recent
synthetic attempts of anthropologists. Even in studying a preliterate society with
its relatively simple culture, we cannot reach a systematic theory of the combination
of psychological, social, economic, technical, linguistic, aesthetic, religious, and
magical phenomena which compose such a culture, except by the use of the simplistic
idealization which is characteristic of men of letters rather than of scientists.
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C consequently, the assumption that by combining the results of various social
sciences we can reach a theoretically valid and coherent knowledge concerning, for
instance, American society, with the tremendous complexity of its culture, calls for
psychological explanation rather than criticism.
Of course, all special social sciences have a common meeting-ground in history,
archeology, and anthropology, and between any two social sciences lie many borderland
problems. But each science approaches such problems from its own point of view and
defines them in its own way. It needs the results of other sciences to solve them,
but it reorganizes and utilizes these results for its own theoretic purposes. In
turn, its results may be utilized by other sciences for their theoretic purposes.
This kind of cooperation is going on all the time. And the more thoroughly, conscien-
tiously, systematically each science attends to its own business, the more useful
its results are to other sciences.
This inability to organize systematically the contributions of several social
sciences to a common theoretic problem is well exemplified just at this moment by
the various encyclopedic studies being made as to the nature, causes, and effects
of war.
Under such conditions, it is a serious transgression of the principles of
intellectual honesty - not to speak of educational principles - for social scientists
to offer university students or the public at large a pot -pourri of fragments arbitrar-
ily selected, superficially simplified, and- loosely combined as if it were an
intellectual symphony of valid, essential, and logically connected truths. The
transgression is aggravated by the fact that most students and the vast majority of
the public do not know the difference, never having been trained in coherent theoretic
thinking about social phenomena.
However, there are other, indirect objectives which all social sciences share
and for the achievement of which integrated work is not only possible, but indispen-
sable. Each of these sciences tries to serve and all of them together can serve the
progressive realization of practical social ideals. Many scientists would think
of these objectives as supreme; their primary theoretic objectives would be merely
instrumental for such ultimate ends, in accordance with Comte's formula: "Savoir
pour prevoir, prevoir pour pouvoir."
We have a splendid model of such integrated work in modern medicine, where
specific theoretic results achieved by human anatomy and physiology, bacteriology,
entomology, botany, chemistry, physics, geography, each working in accordance with
its own premises and standards, are selected and rationally organized for the ultimate
purpose of promoting human health.
The comparison of our own efforts with those of medicine is instructive, for it
shows that the social sciences are more backward in the methods of cooperative
application of their theoretic knowledge than in the methods of theoretic research
and systematization. This is partly due to outside factors: whereas a physician is
socially expected to function both as a man of action and a man of knowledge, using
knowledge to guide action, the social scientist is rarely allowed to function as a
leader in action, while leaders in social action seldom have any scientific knowledge
or even see the need of it for practical guidance. But apart from this old and
familiar obstacle in the way of realizing the practical objectives of the social
sciences, the social scientists themselves have failed so far to integrate methodically
the possible applications of their knowledge with reference to social ideals.
Their task is indeed more difficult than that of members of the medical profession,
who need not reflect critically about their ultimate ends: taking for granted that
health is good and sickness is bad, they can concentrate on the selection of means
for the promotion of health and the elimination of sickness. Whereas social
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scientists cannot take any social values for granted, especially ultimate values for
which they might all work together. Social ideals vary greatly, and acceptance of
any ideal as the supreme one presupposes a critical and selective synthesis of all
important human values. Such a synthesis has always been the function of philosophy;
and now, for many reasons, it is incomparably more important than ever. Of course,
every one philosophizes at this times but a Socrates is not necessary to show us how
inconsistent and superficial home-bred or even college-bred philosophers are, if they
have not been thoroughly educated in coherent, long-range thinking about the vast
diversity of human values. Therefore, social scientists and social leaders need
first and foremost a great, inclusive philosophy of social life to guide them. It
should be a philosophy looking toward the future, for we are facing a world of
increasingly rapid and chaotic changes and must know whither to direct this flood of
changes. But it is impossible to think intelligently about the future without a
knowledge of the past.
Thus, the philosophy we need must be founded on the history of human values and
we may expect American philosophers to collaborate with American historians in
creating it. Beginnings have already been made, but time presses.
Once we have agreed on our ultimate practical objectives, specialists in
various social sciences can concentrate on cooperative studies of the means by which
these objectives may be most effectively approached.
Let us take a familiar example: the problem of an international legal order.
Whereas the legal order of a nation is the product of a long and continuous evolution,
deeply rooted in its entire culture, the cultural foundations of an international
order are laid by rational social technology. This means that legal and political
planning must take into consideration those existing social forces which can be
utilized to make such a plan effective, as well as those which are bound to interfere
with its realization, and adequate techniques must be invented to bring the first
kind of forces into action and to counteract the second kind of forces. But only a
few of these forces are scientifically known to lawyers and political scientists.
Most of them either have been or can be methodically investigated by other special
sciences, each dealing with a specific aspect of collective human life. Psychology,
sociology, educational theory, economics, religionistics, human geography, anthropology,
and history contain, each separately, some indispensable knowledge which can be
applied in devising essential and effective techniques . Without their cooperative
guidance, any attempt to maintain an international order will inevitably fail.
The desirability of an international order is accepted by most social philosophers
and scientists, for this is one of the practical objectives on which there is the
least disagreement between competent thinkers. The problem is mainly, if not entirely,,
a problem of means. And here, as a sociologist, I find fundamental deficiencies in
every plan for an international order which I have seen so far, due to the fact that
the planners are ignorant or neglectful of some of the most powerful forces of in-group
solidarity, inter-group antagonism, and inter-group cooperation which sociology has
been investigating. Likewise, a psychologist, a theorist of education, an economist,
a religionist, a human geographer, an anthropologist, a historian, when critically
analyzing these plans in the light of the discoveries of his own science, will
certainly find other fundamental deficiencies, also due to ignorance or neglect.
This indicates how undeveloped the collaboration still is between social sciences
in the pursuit of common ultimate objectives . Its development calls for a tremendous
amount of work, and this work must be guided by thorough and original methodological
reflection.
F» W. Znaniecki
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GENEKAL EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
In a broad sense, the basic data of the Social Sciences are the daily acts of
men, — acts of all sorts; but mostly of the manual and verbal types. For the pur-
poses of this paper, it may be assumed that no question is to be raised about the
methods by which the reliability of these social data are established. The main point
to be noted is that, once they have been gained, they can easily be grouped into
classes. The acts of ruling and of being ruled, for example, lead to political
science, and acts of buying, selling, trading, and all of the arrangements connected
with them, lead to economics and its associated disciplines. There are other groups
of acts which are related to the motives for any acting at all, and to results which
are repeated so often that they become, at first, fixed customs, and then slowly
take on a legal status. Hence the branch of social science known as law* But even
these three classes of acts can be arranged in different orders, and grouped into
different patterns. By all odds, the most venerable of these patterns is constructed
according to the passage of time, so that history, the year-wise ordering of acts,
has long been known as one of the first of the social sciences. Of newer ways of
grouping the raw data of the social sciences, the most important appear to be
anthropology, penology, and sociology, but the last of these, namely, sociology,
instead of confining itself to a particular class of human acts, or to some selected
pattern, has sought to embrace all of the social sciences. This goal is revealed
in frequent efforts to lay bare the foundations of every kind of living together.
In some cases, the sociologist sets himself forth as an engineer of human acts in
social relations and he is to be compared, therefore, with the natural engineer.
In this event, he invades and is invaded by ethics, education, philosophy, psychology,
and geography which are also known as social sciences.
Now it is not in defense of these ways of grouping the acts of men, or of
deriving the several branches of social science, that this paper is written. On the
contrary, the fact that these disciplines can be used both as fields of reeearch
and as the subject matter for programs of teaching, IS the really important matter.
The first thing to be noted is that, in addition to the patterns just cited, the
raw data of the social sciences can be resolved into almost any other kind of pattern
whatsoever. One such pattern, the time -wise pattern, has already been suggested
by the discipline known as history. It is almost too obvious to say that there can
be a hstory of the whole race of men, or a history of each institution, or a history
of certain ideas as they have been stated in verbal form, or a history of warfare,
or a history of the family, and so on. Furthermore, the raw data of the social
sciences can be arranged in cycles of events, in cultural patterns, in ideologies,
and in the total drift of events often called progress. The second fact to be noted
is that the acts of men, both verbal and manual, and irrespective of the ways in
which they have been patterned, are often fused with artifacts, that is, with the
products of the acts of men. The clearest case is anthropology, but the fine arts
and the humanities are equally good instances . The third thing to be noted is
that both the acts of men, and the products of these acts, are easily detached from
the motives which impel men toward any action at all, and from the conditions which
guide conduct toward goals. They appear, then, to be self-generated and self-contained
orders of fact superimposed on socially behaving men. Two examples are of particular
import for the immediate purpose. The verbal acts of men are readily transformed
into written words, whereupon, subject to the laws of grammar, they become theories,
formulae, postulates, and principles. When this happens, some of the social sciences
do not appear to concern the acts of men at all. They concern, on the contrary,
only a theoretical structure, of which economic, political, and philosophical
systems are clear examples. The other instance is supplied by the word institution.
Even though institutions like the family, the nation, the state, the church, or the
penal colony, are composed of socially directed acts of individual men, it has been
easy to suppose that institutions are like organisms which are able to live their
own kinds of lives, and obey the laws of their own inner natures.
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These brief comments, even though they touch matters that are hotly debatable,
ought to make it obvious that the educational uses of the social sciences create a
major problem. Indeed, they create a problem which takes on the proportions of a
crisis when an attempt is made to relate the social sciences to general education.
Three theses are to be advanced with respect to this crisis. The first is that the
social sciences, as they are now organized, are scarcely of any value to general
education. The main reason is that general education is a psychological and not a
subject matter preface to specialized education. It is a preface in the sense that
general education should be designed further to develop the mental abilities of youth.
There should be no quibbling about this proposition. Youth of early college age are
in one of their most sensitive and seminal stages of growth. They are about to
complete the passage they have been making from childish to adult levels of mental
capacity. For the successful completion of this passage, they require intense
training in the ways of adult thinking, that is, in the processes of discriminating,
inferring, deducing, judging, generalizing, comparing, and all the rest, and to an
increasing degree, on the level of the abstract. This developmental purpose is not
easily served by the incessant learning of detailed facts set forth in small doses
from the various fields of knowledge. But it should be noted at once, lest this
statement be misinterpreted, that education cannot proceed without any subject matter
at all. There must be subject matter, and plenty of it, but for the proper maturation
of mental abilities, and for a suitable supply of ideas, concepts and other remembered
materials, youth should be provided with a broad foundation of general principles
touching the mental or cultural as opposed to the natural aspects of man's total
experience. In their existing state, the social sciences can serve neither of these
purposes of general education. As they stand, the social sciences are the product
of the expert and the scholar, both of whom are either anatomists of human affairs
or theorists in a realm of verbal constructs whose roots with behaving men have been
severed. Save, perchance, for history, the social sciences are in that early stage
of any human effort where an increase in the number of facts to be reported appears
to be more significant than their uses for educational purposes at those capacity
levels characteristic of junior college youth.
But this negative statement must be followed immediately by two positive state-
ments that will clarify the meaning of what has been said. The principal question is:
What must be done in order to make the social sciences useful to general education?
The two answers to be offered in reply to this question require a return to the basic
data of the social sciences, namely, the acts of men, both manual and verbal. In
their original form, those acts are the particulars of individual biographies. There
are as many of them as there are items in the biographies of all of the men who have
ever lived. But men readily lose themselves in the forest of particulars, as the
sociologist is so prone to do. In order to escape confusion, all of the sciences
proceed to generalize their data as fast as possible. They attempt to draw out the
concepts, the condensed universale, the underlying principles, from the plethora of
individual data. But the search for the general or the universal has not borne
fruit in the social sciences as a whole. To be sure, each of these sciences has
made a heroic attempt to derive what might be the equivalent of natural laws for the
mental and cultural worlds. But the attempts have failed. The reason is suggested
by Holmes' famous question as to whether law is logic or experience. When taken
as logic, law presents a beautiful verbal picture, but concrete justice to real men
is not a part of the picture. When taken as experience, law drifts back toward the
particulars, and in this event, there are no guiding principles which will offer
standards against which justice can be measured.
It is to be inferred from these considerations that neither in the form of logic
nor in the form of experience, is law suitable for the purposes of general education.
Law as logic is for the specialist. Law as experience is informing but it is not
educating. The confusion is even worse in sociology and in some forms of history
than it is in law. Save for the undefined concept of progress, and a whole class of
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concepts regarding culture areas, environments, instincts, human ecology, propaganda,
the diffusion of cultures, and the like, sociology has been able to find no genotypical,
that is, no generalized laws which will express the dynamic principles of social life.
But even so, interest in this direction is the province of the scholar, and by this
token, it is not the province of the educator. What is left is a vast and rambling
array of particular acts and events, and while these facts are, like infractions of
the law, somewhat informing, they are, unlike law, more on the order of propaganda
than on the order of education. This is true in particular when social facts take
the form of social studies in the high school program and which are often designed
to create a new social order. In this case, they are not education at all. They
are propaganda in its most unabashed forms. But in spite of these difficulties,
there are certain ideas, principles and practices which, while they take a specialized
form in each of the social sciences, nevertheless take a general form for the human
family as a whole. Ideas like freedom, justice, democracy, authoritarianism, value,
permanence, change, and individualism, and practices like slavery, commercial exploita-
tion, barter and exchange, institutional organization, and military campaigns, are
the warp and woof on which the patterns of social life have been woven. Each of
these basic ideas and practices has passed through mighty adventures. I submit
that an orderly account of these adventures will provide adequate materials for
general education in the social sciences. They will provide adequate materials for
general education as long as they remain close to a description of what men have
been striving toward in response to the conflicts they have sought to evade in working
out their life plans.
This assertion leads to the second approach to the uses of the social sciences
in general education. It was said a moment ago that the acts of men, which are the
raw materials of the social sciences, can easily be detached from the men themselves.
After separation, and after they are confused with products and results, that is,
with cultural artifacts of all sorts, they can be viewed as self-contained and self-
explanatory organizations of data. They appear to be subject to their own self-
contained principles of being, and to be necessarily true or false independently of
the market place. But it is just at this point that they lose their dynamic contact
with what men want and with the reasons why men have behaved as they have. The
social sciences then appear to be unmotivated sciences. They are like a description
of natural events without any knowledge or theory as to why these events occur in
their own dynamic settings.! It is in the search for motivation that the social
1 Except, of course, for all kinds of special agents, such as social forces, the
power of government, the progressive trend in history, the instinct of criminality,
and all the rest.
sciences make contact with the science of human nature, but almost every attempt
to complete this contact, at least in recent years, has been a failure. The fault,
however, does not lie with the social sciences. It lies with the psychologists who
have been so much in earnest to make their discipline one of the natural sciences
that they have lost their lines of communication with the social sciences.
But there are signs of recovery. In spite of his imaginative pictures and
his flair for sexual data, Freud has altered the human nature situation. To be
sure, the number of facts he has added to the science are extremely limited; but his
guesses about the nature of human nature are among the shrewest that have ever been
made. When some phases of psychoanalytic theory are combined with the experimental
tradition, a wholly new view, or more precisely, the original and intensely dynamic
view of human nature, comes to light. The acts of men, the raw data of the social
sciences, are found to arise from conflicts and tensions induced by the discrepancies
between what they want and what they are able to get. There are no purposeless acts.
The unit of human nature research is not an idea in the mind or a reflex in the body
but an adjustive act. The raw data of the social sciences, therefore, including the
products associated with them, spring from what may be called the mechanisms of
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adjustment to life situations. The goals for which men will strive, the ends to
which they will aspire, and the guides that they will use along the route of a directed
action, are supplied by their culture or by their memories and ideas about that cul-
ture. But the dynamics of adjustment, the motives that give rise to the events of
history, of economics, of politics, or of law, are the human nature basis of the
social sciences
.
It is proposed, then, that a study of the dynamic sources of human conduct, of
the motives that drive men to action, of the defeats, shames, and insults that they
suffer, and of the devious routes that they follow in order to defend their social
role and achieve a sense of security and prestige are a natural preface to the social
sciences. Facts of this order give both the specialized and the generalized data
of the social sciences the dynamic principles which underlie all human effort. That
growing youth should be able, or that they should be asked, to try to understand
the meaning of any of the social sciences apart from the dynamic circumstances from
which the raw data arise is to leave the social sciences suspended in midair. It is
to deprive them of educational significance. That men commit crimes, that they
trade votes, that they conduct campaigns for conquest, that they seek a balance of
power, that they are the servants of custom, that they summon the power of the law,
that they embrace fascism, democracy, or communism, —all of these are irrefutable
data. They are, however, nothing but the symptoms of an underlying dynamic situation
which contains the whys of any action whatsoever. A study of this underlying dynamic
situation is a central factor in any plan of general education, for it creates the
tools by which youth can understand the meaning of the social sciences, to say
nothing of their relations to other kinds of experience.
But something else is also achieved. If the great adventures through which a
selected list of cultural ideas and practices have passed are made one of the subject
matter fields of general education, and if these adventures are firmly rooted in
the dynamic conditions which explain why men behave as they do, three gains for
general education will have been reached. The first is mastery of a kind of subject
matter. It is subject matter neither of unorganized particulars or of detached
constructs at an ethereal verbal level, but of certain fundamental ideas and practices
common to any sort of cultural life. If they are chosen wisely, they will form the
core of civilized conduct. The second gain is a kind of subject matter which is
factual enough to satisfy the capacity level for concrete behavior from which college
age youth are emerging, and also the capacity level for abstract behavior toward
which they ought to be moving. In both cases, emphasis by way of methods of teaching
on the further development of mental abilities will prepare youth for the specialized
training and the independence of judgment that lie ahead. The third gain can be
stated as follows. If the social sciences are prefaced by and associated with a
dynamic psychology, each youth becomes a problem to himself in the sense that rela-
tions will constantly be established between his own wants and desires, and the record
of his forefathers who, in facing the same wants and desires, slowly and steadily
found the standards, the principles, the ideas, the values, and the practices that
have proved to be the most adequate satisfiers of fundamental needs and of civilized
ambitions
.
Coleman R. Griffith
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In the average combat unit about to assault the enemy position there will be
an overwhelming majority of men with more or less normal nerver who dislike acutely
the situation in which they find themselves but who recognize that the only thing
for them to do is pull together and to get through their job efficiently and if
possible without damage to themselves. They advance when they must and keep cover
when they can. However, among this great majority will be found a very few individ-
uals with abnormal nervous reactions. Most uncommon is the type who takes it all
as a huge joke and seems to get a certain pleasurable stimulus from his position.
The clang of successive shell bursts in his neighborhood, the whistle of machine
gun fire simply make him chuckle with glee. He is a very rare type; he will probably
get a D.S.C.; but it probably will be posthumous. Another abnormal nervous type
finds it imperative to make his way to the rear with tales of woe, disaster and ruin.
Without any trace of mendacity he will tell you tales of whole battalions marched
by incompetent officers in close formation under enemy fire and perishing to a man.
This type can be left to make his way back, ultimately one imagines to be maintained
in sanitariums at government expense unless he chances to fall in with potential
neurotics when a sharp tap on the head with a pistol butt is indicated.
In this war one notices the same thing occuring on the home front. Among a
vast majority of people in intellectual pursuits plugging away at their jobs pleasant
or unpleasant, taking on extra work as best they can, you have a few wild enthusiasts
with roseate dreams of a glorious future; other exceptional persons regrettably more
numerous, prophesying woe and destruction. Either education and in particular the
social sciences are going to achieve the millenium offhand, either the social sciences
must rise to the opportunity of remaking the globe, or the liberal arts are doomed;
an era of education is coming to ai end and all our former educational practices
are proven untrue over night. And unfortunately on the civilian front there is no
enemy machine gun fire to cut down roseate enthusiasts and cracking a defeatist over
the head would get you only unfavorable publicity and a jail sentence.
No doubt facetiousness in so solemn an assemblage is misplaced but I seriously
believe that in appraising the situation that confronts general education and in
particular the social sciences we shall do well to assume that the war will not
abolish all education but vocational education. In all human probability, — and I
hope the prediction is not unpatriotic, — the men who will come back from the war to
the colleges will in a considerable measure come back escapists. They will seek
refuge from the grime, the horror, the sordidness, from mechanical nightmares and
infernos, from the memories of things that once were living men swelling horribly
day by day till the uniforms for which they once died seem in the devils own grizly
humor to be the attire of grotesque downs . .And they will seek that refuge not in
studies of technique but where men have always sought escape from such memories, in
beauty. The more intellectual will seek that beauty where men have found it for
2^ centuries, in the philosophies, the humanities, the literatures, the arts. In
short, they will come back to the type of education that teaches a man to enjoy and
to live; to that discipline for which latterly we have sought out that singularly
barren and mechanic term "general education."
Once you set education that ideal it does not matter particularly how you divide
it up. You may divide it at the 8th, 12th, and 16th grades; at the 8th and the
l^th grades; between the 12th and 14th grades or indeed as you will. However you
divide it, however you accelerate it, however you retard it, certain things will
inevitably be in it.
There must be the ability to think clearly without muzziness in your ideas and
to express those ideas so that other men can understand them. Therefore, there must
be that mastery of logical discourse which we call rhetoric. In a world which
certainly will be more international rather than less so it will be well if the student
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understand what Huckleberry Finn so laboriously tried to explain to Jim — that a
Frenchman when he wishes to inquire if you speak French is not insulting you if he
says, "Polley voo franzy?" In other words he should have at least some introduction
to the idea that language is partly the medium, partly the moulder of other mens
thinking.
Our student should grasp by a study of the exact and physical sciences that
strange geometrical rhythm which .seems to run through the universe. He should
recognize and delight in the lavish profusion with which nature invests this rhythm
with pulsing life and he should therefore know what he may of the biological sciences,
Still more should he understand the human life around him, the manner in which the
content and the working of men's minds determines their place in the universe; how
far enlightened self-interest controls them and why and how far enlightened self-
interest is swept aside by gusts of passion and emotion, by, if you choose, the
psychological experiences of their childhood, by fixed habits of thought, by the
mores of their society, by legends, and by religion.
And he needs more than this to give him intellectual balance and compensation in
a changing world of human society. There must be a depth, a background to his
thinking lest when his social order seems to change over night he be left naked and
ashamed. He must know the past of his race in order to face unafraid its future. In
a dynamic world of change he must recognize that change itself only slowly departs
from patterns and cycles already traced in the past. Looking back to the rise and
fall of empires in the ancient world he will be unabashed in the world of empires in
which he will live. Perceiving how deep and how far rooted in the past are the ideals
of human liberty he will be confident that no autocrat has a strong enough back to
uproot them. He will see certain patterns of racial behavior continually reasserting
themselves. Remembering Charlemagne and Barbarossa, those earlier fuhrers of the
Deutsche Reich; he need not be perturbed when he may hear tales of a Schicklgruber
seated in the deepest vault of Berchtesgaden, his mustache grown through the stone
table on which he leans waiting the appointed time to emerge and recall to life the
vanished National Socialist Reich.
Indeed the one danger that we have to fear in the future is that Germany may
take her conquerors captive; that our young men may return from the European and the
Asiatic fronts to an America in which with the very best of intentions their education
will have been regimented and standardized and prescribed; to an America in which
all the paths of education save vocational education may have been blocked up. And
that danger I do not fear greatly. As an officer you may command your men to march
from dusk to dawn, to advance through enemy fire and you will find them docile; try
to hint at a Presidential candidate to them and see the storm you arouse* We may
as well resign ourselves now to the fact that these young men returned to us from the
gates of hell, will not bo easy to manage. To avoid friction we will be wiser to
convince ourselves and our colleagues in advance if we can of the futility of too much
prescription. — Let us be humble and remind ourselves that we are little more than
the successors of those Roman slaves who led their young masters to the school. Once
in it, they learn what they will. We may assist them, by setting this or that
conception before them, but in the end we come back to the fact, that they have
learned, in contradistinction to what they have crammed for examination, what they
will.
And if under our guidance they have learned to live let us be satisfied. They
may need for their own livings to learn various trades or crafts; the trade of a
chemist, of an engineer, of a lawyer, of a teacher, of a physician. They may even
learn the craft of a statistician, of an expert in protocol, of a social worker, even
of a Historical Specialist, ($2600 to $6500 a year) and well and good. But aside
from this let us not imagine that we can by taking thought in our teaching of the
social sciences teach them further than to have life and have it more abundantly.
Let us not delude ourselves that we can anyway by our teaching of the social sciences
'. r . • •
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teach them to become leaders of their people, Presidents, Lend-Lease administrators
or even Mayors of villages and Presidents of women's clubs. Let us not be so naive
as those educators in ancient Athens who one year professed to teach the art of
fighting in heavy armor, and the next, all that a man need know of civic virtue.
If we do, we shall deserve to hear an ironic voice breaking in on us: "And then the
art of the administrator is to get himself appointed?" "And then the art of the
statesman is to get himself elected?" If it merely is a question of getting ahead
in public life, our students can teach themselves far more in student politics than
we can possibly teach them.
But above all, let us flee in terror from that kingdom of darkness whose consti-
tuion is that only the technical, the concrete, the scientific in education is
worthy. The most pressing danger to the human race is that the capacity to plot,
plan and devise the mechanical means of destruction shall continue to increase in
the geometrical ratio, while the sense of morality and humanity, and the teaching
of the social sciences and of history increases barely in the arithmetic. In little
more than two centuries the opinion of the human race expressed by a monarch of
fable has become more alarming than ever. "I cannot but conclude the bulk of your
natives to be the most pernicious race of little odious vermin, that nature ever
suffered to crawl upon the surface of the earth." Unless we gain anew a sense of
the dignity and importance of man and the human race we shall destroy ourselves
as surely as the Germany in the long run would have eventually destroyed themselves.
We shall have fought and won in vain unless our education emphasizes more strongly
than ever before the human values that can only be gained by the free human spirit....
T. C. Pease
A publicly supported university has three instructional functions; namely, to
prepare students to do research in the various fields of intellectual specialization,
to prepare individuals for the professions (and here we include the profession of the
social administrator described by Professor Goble), and to provide a program of
general education for all students regardless of whether they are to follow the
vocation of research, to become members of the professions, or to assume other
responsibilities in the society. I am here concerned with general education and
only with that part of it which involves the social disciplines, and I shall here-
after speak of that part as social education.
It is my intention to set forth three significant purposes of social education
and to suggest an instructional program for their fulfillment. The purposes which I
wish to discuss are 1) the development of a common set of social values, 2) the
understanding of crucial social problems, and 3) discipline in methods of thinking
about social problems.
The first and perhaps most fundamental of these purposes is the development of
common social directions. The fact that we are today suffering from widespread
confusion and conflict about values—the ends to be served--is so well documented
by students of society that it can no longer be seriously challenged. With the
development of science and technology, the activities of men have become more and
more finely differentiated. The system of common values that comprised the basis
of social judgment in the earlier years of our society, is now rapidly dissolving
in the acids of specialization. Social perspectives are becoming highly specialized
and partial. Men tend to see problems, facts and values from the standpoint of their
fragmented social outlooks. Their specialized minds are but fragments compared to
the mind required by the total community life. At the same time, however, men are
increasingly interdependent, even if only in a mechanical sense, in the processes
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by which they carry on the activities essential to their material welfare. Thus
arises the paradoxical situation of a people whose specialized behavior has widespread
social consequences and yet whose sense of values and social directions and whose
patterns of thought are highly differentiated, conflicting and confused.
Moreover, social problems involve relations among people—among their interests,
attitudes, conceptions and modes of thinking. Solutions to these problems hence
require the reconstruction of the characters of the persons involved in the problems
to the end that mutual purposes and some measure of common social orientation are
attained as a basis of social action. This fact means that the people, at least the
people of a democracy, are themselves inextricably involved in social problems. They
are not only factors in the problems but furthermore the resoJ.ution of the problems
and the reconstruction of the ideas and characters of individuals must proceed
simultaneously and reciprocally.
We often believe that students come to us empty-headed. This is not the case.
On the contrary, their minds are literally filled with incompatible social beliefs
and ideals that have been deposited in the common sense of the people from various
historical periods. These notions and ideals, uncritically and even unconsciously
held, are the ones which actually function in the social judgments and actions of
our students. Instruction too often over-lays them with a technical vocabulary and
with verbal facility in the principles of the social sciences, leaving the original
uncritical notions and ideals in actual control of the individual's behavior. If
such an educational abortion, is to be avoided, the work in social education must seek
to make students aware of their own ideas, social prejudices and points of view and
to help them to evaluate and to reconstruct these common sense notions and social
outlooks. And, may I add in all humility, that this is a task which the staff must
do for itself no less than for the students
.
If this analysis is correct, it would seem that one of the first tasks of
social education should be to help students to discover the various social perspectives
now operating and to seek for an integration of perspectives when these emerge in
social conflicts and issues; but always with the view to helping the students and
the instructors to build more inclusive and more satisfactory social outlooks as a
basis of common social judgment and action. The tultimate goal is a system of basic
values cooperatively built and generally understood and held, though not uncritically,
by all persons regardless of occupation, race, religion, or social position.
A second need is for sensitiveness to, and a clear understanding of, the crucial
social problems which this and the coming generation cannot escape. The advancement
of science and technology not only breeds specialized social outlooks but also
necessitates changes in social ideas, institutions and practices. Old institutional
forms and social practices that emerged in earlier conditions must be changed as new
conditions render them inadequate. These changes set the fundamental social problems
in which all persons are unavoidably involved. The controversies involved in efforts
to keep production and consumption balanced at a high level, to extend adequate
medical care to all persons, to expand educational opportunities to the entire popula-
tion, to conserve human and natural resources, to work out the proper controls and
directives of economic activities, to extend democracy into all human relationships
are but a sampling of the sorts of issues an understanding of which is incumbent
upon all persons as citizens
.
This does not mean that the citizen will understand, nor indeed that he needs
to understand, these problems to the same extent as does the expert. But it does
mean that he must know what the problems are, he must understand the values at stake,
he must have an adequate set of social conceptions, he must grasp the significant
facts, he must be able to ascertain who will benefit from different proposed solu-
tions and he must understand social strategy and know when it is democratic and when
it is not. Citizens cannot turn over the solution of social problems solely to
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experts, no matter how good the intentions of the experts, without yielding the right
to determine the course of their lives . Such a procedure would in the long run
reduce the welfare of the people to the wishes of the experts whose benevolence is
likely to be no greater than that of any other group of arbitrary rulers. For social
problems necessarily involve questions of ends as well as of means and in a democracy
participation in the determination of ends is the prerogative and duty of every
citizen. It follows that the effectiveness of the research expert and of the social
technologist is no less dependent upon the general state of public understanding
than the public welfare is dependent upon the services of the expert. A careful
study of social problems, national and international, ought therefore to be a part
of a program of social education.
It follows from the notion that students should study social problems with the
view to becoming responsible and intelligent members of society that they should be
disciplined in effective methods of thinking about and resolving social issues and
conflicts. Moreover, as citizens, individuals are necessarily called upon to deal
with social problems that arise in the community or in the society at large. Such
problems always reflect differences and conflicts among the members of the community.
These differences may be about values. They may be about the means to be used in
attaining ends on which there is agreement. They may be about the facts of the
situation. For each of these points of conflict there are appropriate procedures
for its resolution and all students should be disciplined in them.
What program of courses will best attain these purposes? To answer this
question would require cooperative study and planning by a competent staff. It is
not indefensible, however, to suggest a program for discussion and further study.
It must be recognized at the outset that these purposes cannot be realized in
less than 15 to 20 semester hours of course work. We cannot play at the business of
social education and attain results. I suggest three courses: a) a course in the
origin and development of the democratic ideology; b) a course in crucial social
problems; and c) a course in methods of thinking.
The content of the course in the origin and development of the democratic
ideology should be primarily normative. The values to be critically studied are
found in the literature of the democratic tradition. The primary purpose should be
to understand and to rebuild these values and to help the student learn to use them
in making social judgments. This requires that the course explore the origins of our
basic social ideals. Not only would the origins of the values be studied but also
the way in which they have been interpreted by various social groups to meet the
demands of new conditions, created by industrial and economic changes, would be
considered. Moreover, attention would be given to some of the competing ideologies
which have arisen to challenge our value -system and the evidence for and against
these various systems, including our own, would be studied critically. In short,
the course should be an intellectual and social history of democratic values and
institutions in the modern period.
The second course, for which the intellectual history of democracy is a founda-
tion, should be built around social problems treated at the local, national and
world levels. These problems should be studied primarily as social issues and
conflicts involving competing individual and group perspectives. As an example,
let us consider the problem of providing better housing. Some of the factors
involved in solving this problem would be man power, materials, technical knowledge
and skills and the dispositions of persons. It seems clear that any adequate study
of the situation will disclose that we have the man power, materials, and technical
knowledge and skills to improve housing conditions immeasurably. Although we still
need developments along these lines, they are not the things which prevent the con-
struction of better houses. We have far more of these things than we use. It is
primarily the dispositions of persons which prevent the use of them in the development
I.
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of a housing program. All sorts of individual and group interests, prejudices and
points of view are awakened every time a move is made in the direction of better
living conditions. These come into conflict, and, in the absence of a common value-
orientation and of discipline in intellectual methods of dealing with such conflicts,
action is too often precluded. The point I am making is that, since the character
of a person is always expressed in his social judgments and actions, conflicting
personal structures are at the very heart of every social problem in a highly frag-
mented culture such as the one in which we live. If this be true, the study of
social problems must begin with conflicting interests and values and aim at rebuild-
ing them in the search for more inclusive perspectives within which social action can
proceed.
Nothing that has been said should be taken to mean that facts and conceptions
would be minimized or reduced. Instead, they would be used more than ever. For as
points of view and social ideas and beliefs are examined and reconstructed and as
the probable consequences of proposed courses of action are recognized and evaluated,
many facts and principles will be used from an extensive range of subjects — political
science, sociology, economics, history, education, psychology, biology, anthropology,
philosophy, geography and so on. In the study of these problems, therefore, values,
facts and conceptions would be integrated in the mind of the student and learned in
a context in which the student's own points of view and interests are vitally
involved.
The third course, though not necessarily the third in point of study, should
attempt to make students conscious of the fact that they have habits of thinking
and that these habits can be improved by consciously trying to do so. And, further-
more, a deliberate effort should be made to wipe out the poor habits and to replace
them by more effective ones. This much should be required even of high school
pupils, not to mention college students, as a condition of effective participation
4,n social affairs. Today when deliberate efforts, on a world wide scale and through
all iihe avenues of communication, are being made to control people through the mani-
pulation of symbols and through irrational arguments, a study of one's own thinking
and that of others from the standpoint of logic, language and psychology as a part
of an adequate program of social education should no longer be denied. I am of course
not suggesting that we attempt to make students into logicians, nor am I proposing
a course in formal logic. But surely it is not too much to ask that the student
learn to avoid common errors of thought and of social judgment and to recognize
these errors when they occur in the thinking of other people.
The instructional material used in the course should be social in character.
It might be taken from newspapers, magazines, public addresses and books on current
social issues and conflicts. In studying the materials stress should be laid, for
example, upon the ability to tease out the position taken by a writer or speaker
and to withhold criticism until this has been done, to look for assumptions underlying
the position, to search out implications, both good and bad, to distinguish inference
and judgment from observations, to look for the values at stake in the position and
to do many other intellectual activites required in sound thinking.
Turning now from the program of social education to the difficulties of working
out a program of any sort, I should like to make one observation which is little more
than a deduction from the earlier part of my discussion. Changing an educational
program, or indeed any part of an institution, is not primarily a matter of of changing
instructional materials, schedules, course hours, nor even the organization of courses,
although these things are of necessity involved. But it is primarily a matter of
changing the characters of the members of the staff and modifying the expectations
of the students. Aa universityinstructors, we are highly specialized creatures,
possessing not only specialized knowledge but also the prejudices and fragmented
perspectives peculiar to our trade as well as those common sense notions which we
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have absorbed in our non-specialized activities. All these prejudices, perspectives
and notions influence in one way or another what we think and do about education.
If a program of social education is to be worked out, therefore, it will be necessary
for us to rebuild ourselves as we rebuild the program. We cannot remain as we are
and provide an adequate program of social education.
In no less degree must the expectations of the students be changed. They have
been taught, by the very nature of their prior school career, to expect certain
things in courses. And many of them no doubt would be shocked to find that they
were in courses which made social values central and which required that they think
critically and that they learn to think better.
B. 0. Smith
INTERDEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
The topic which I have been asked to discuss is "interdepartmental Cooperation
in the Social Sciences." In a way, it is, perhaps, unfortunate that^sociologist
should be asked to open such a discussion on proposed changes. During the past
fifty years the sociologist has often been suspect by his academic colleagues as
too willing to innovate and too critical of the academic status quo. He has often
been considered volatile, if not outrightly flighty. As a result of academic
disesteem, he has often approached his colleagues in the more "secure" social
sciences with the manner of an exasperated terrier or the gamboling, but destruc-
tive, joviality of Walt Disney's dog Pluto. I intend to do neither, and I propose
to ignore your unflattering stereotypes of sociologists as reckless innovators . In
any case, the sociologist's preoccupation with the social process has made him
acutely conscious of change, as well as, sometimes, overeager to embrace it. Yet,
today, the speed of change in the social structure make even the sociologist a
laggard
.
Since I have been asked to outline possible changes in relations between
departments in. the educational organization of the post-war world at Illinois, I
shall suggest a number of innovations which I believe would be desirable. The close
of the war will be a singularly appropriate time for certain reorganizations and
innovations
. In the international world I would hope for political orders better
adapted than before to the increasing complexity of the lives of the governed. In
the academic world, we must adjust to the increasing heterogeneity of our student
populations and proceed with the ordering and reintegration of our amazingly ramify-
ing fields of learning. In both cases, we will innovate, because adjustment is
imperative, and not because we are suddenly smitten with a desire for Utopian per-
fection. Some changes are inevitable.
But, changes of content and of interdepartmental relations are not strange to
the social sciences. They have been in flux during their brief histories. As
organized academic disciplines, Political Science, Economics, Anthropology and
Sociology have all appeared during the past century. Those aspects of History which
are social science have appeared during that time, as have the parts of Psychology
and Education pertinent to social science. All have added portions of their academic
content through interest, opportunism, and mere accretion. Therefore, it is not
impious to question and reexamine. The humanities have a long tradition, in the
course of which they have intermittently fallen into pedantry, from which they have
been jarred from time to time by the great ground swells of intellectual revolution.
In the meantime, they are urbane. It is a venerable urbanity, ruffled only by
great storms. However, the social sciences are not fixed, not secure. They are
anything but urbane, and are wracked by sudden squalls.
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I hope that the suggestions which I shall make on interdepartmental relations
among the social sciences at Illinois may create at least a riffle, but not a squall.
Lot us briefly consider, First) Courses and Teaching, Second) Faculty Relations and
Seminars, and Third) Methods and Research.
a. Courses and Teaching
Today, many commentators talk irresponsibly as if there were pre-war and post-
war social sciences. In the millenium of the post-war world, they assume that the
social sciences will not only be rapidly expanded, but also, revivified. Perhaps.
But, only if their roots are strong enough to take such a growth. I suspect that
you and I believe that as social sciences they will continue to evolve gradually.
But, what may very well occur is an extensive application of the social sciences.
Among these applications may be new types of courses in teaching students about
their communities and social world and in making applications of the social sciences
to their social life. For example, I would abandon all orientation courses of the
type so popular a decade ago, a popularity from which we, at Illinois, were singular-
ly free. I never did believe in these courses. But, on the other hand, composite
courses which attempt to make applications of the various social sciences may
profitably be increased. A few years ago several of us worked on a course, parts
of which were of this type: Social Science, in the General Curriculum. Collabora-
tion between departments in constructing a course or courses and the assignment of
teachers from the various departments to teach such courses might well be extended.
I could be specific here as to content, but it is not my function tonight to be so.
In any case, this general course should include a review of American history
(I do not know why our students do not know American history after their elementary
and secondary school training, but they do not); some instruction on the value systems
of American culture; a descriptive account of those aspects of our political order
with which they should be acquainted as citizens; descriptive accounts of the princi-
pal types of communities in the U.S.; an account of the organizations about which
they should know something; and instruction on how to be critically literate about
the content of the major means of communication.
I can see the possibility of developing a year-long course which would provide
for the student the most pertinent data from the various social sciences for applica-
tion to his life situation. It would be the university version of the secondary
school's social studies courses, and might well be required of all university
students, at the Sophomore level, and optional for Fresbmen. This should in no
way interfere with the Liberal Arts student proceeding to the specialized study of
particular fields in his Junior year. And, may I say, parenthetically, that the
staffs of the various social science departments would be increased rather than
decreased, for all the numerous instructors of such a course would naturally be
also political scientists, economists, historians, psychologists, philosophers, or
sociologists
.
This course should be constructed for use with all university students from all
undergraduate colleges. It should be required of Sophomores, but might be elected
by Freshmen who wish to fulfill this requirement earlier and find time to do so.
Its content should be revised frequently, and with great care. It should be
adequately administered and supervised.
In addition to the introduction of a general required course, there are some
courses which, because of a content which cuts across departmental lines, should be
administered by the Division of the Social Sciences. This classification of courses
should not be a kind of "catch-all" of courses logically necesarry, but unwelcome
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in particular departments. There are many such areas of knowledge, especially in
the application of the various social sciences. I shall not attempt to point to
them this evening. But I believe that a committee should carefully prepare a report
on courses of such diverse content and recommend their establishment, rather than
that ve should permit mere accretion rather than logical ordering.
Increased interdepartmental borrowing of the services of the faculty members
to deliver lectures in the sections of existing courses where collaboration could
be most fruitful should be encouraged. The areas in which such interchange would
be most effective in terms of the special knowledge of our existing faculty would
be readily apparent, if we were thinking in terms of such interchange of services.
I should suggest the appointment of committees to create special listings of
existing courses and the recommending of such new courses as would be deemed necessary
for undergraduate curricula in various fields. While stressing general Liberal Arts
training (as we should unquestionably do) it may be possible at the same time to
better direct the curricula of those students who have vocational objectives.
b. Faculty Relations and Seminars.
Among the folk peoples of Yucatan there is a game of breaking pottery. The
elders who organize the game hide prizes in earthen pots which are then swung in the
air by a rope. Then the young men, with clubs in their hands, dash at these
earthen pots, leap in the air, smash them, and get what is inside. The results are
often surprising, dismaying, disappointing, and even amusing. In the social sciences
we have been ..ecreting materials, possibly prizes, within the rounded confines of
our various subjects for the past fifty years. A little pottery breaking may be
in order. To that end, I should suggest a number of interdepartmental faculty semin-
ars to meet regularly for a year. If they were unproductive they could then be
abandoned. There should be a sufficient numberof these seminar groups to include
every member of every social science department. They should organize, elect a
chairman, and then decide on a number of basic problems cutting across departmental
lines to which they would seriously devote themselves as a seminar group for a year.
By the end of that year considerable interchange of presuppositions, concepts,
methods and statements of objectives should have occurred. There would also be
some intensification of conflict. I am not one of those naive practitioners of the
technique of solving controversies by joining in mutual discussion and "telling
all." But, at this point, I am not primarily concerned with lessening conflict.
In any case, I have enough faith in the circumlocutions, the reticences, and the
vested interest of the academic mind in partial concealment, that I would not expect
us to be completely revelatory. I know that I shall not be. There are fundamental
issues today on which we have attitudes and beliefs and opinions which we do not
and will not completely divulge. Yet, these positions are pertinent to much of our
work in the social sciences. Take such issues as degrees of belief in kinds of
authoritarianism versus popular democracy; degrees of belief in an economic order
based on capitalism, state socialism and points between; degrees of belief in the
mutability of the organism by environment and culture; degrees of belief in naturalism
versus supernaturalism; degrees of belief in international ordering of society, and
so forth. On fundamental issues one does not expect invariable explicitness from
his colleagues, though much is communicated by implication. But, in the long run,
I believe that the process of discussion, if reasonably controlled, would be
beneficial. Despite implicit or explicit disagreement at times on fundamental
positions, the seminars should be a fruitful interchange. Of course, the adminis-
tration should provide all secretarial or clerical help requested by the various
chairmen of seminars
.
•
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b. Methods and Research
I do not believe there exists a general social science. Nor are there social
science methods. However, in the application of the various social sciences, fruit-
ful collaboration on research and methods is obviously possible. And, within the
special social sciences, methods can profitably be borrowed from other special social
sciences. An experimental attitude and the welcoming of innovation in method is
quite necessary in these young social sciences. During the past ten years there
has been much ado about method in these fields. A certain sterility is induced by
overconcern about validity of methods at this time. It appears to me that as a
result we have an increased output of less significant studies. The life of an
individual or of a society is not adequately recorded by the methods of the present
social sciences. The way forward is not increasing exactitude about less and less
significant details of that life, but in giving the maximum froedom to imaginative
innovators who are actively encouraged to use such methods as they may devise for
their particular problems. I am constantly struck by the lack of subtly incisive
and ingenuous methods and commentary in the research of our fields. For the moment,
let our methods multiply. We should worry more about standardization of methods when
there is more to standardize. Moreover, I firmly believe that much of the most
important basic social science research will continue to be done by original,
incisive individual minds, and not by teams of researchers. But such minds pick up
fruitful methods wherever they find them, and some cross fertilization might result
from the faculty seminars that I have suggested.
At the undergraduate level, it is unlikely that we shall effectively teach
scientific method, but, whenever possible, we should endeavor to do so. However,
we can teach students to evaluate critically the results of those methods which have
been used in the social sciences, and which have been popularized. They appear in
the statistics, charts, graphs, etc. as used in popular communication. I would
include as one section of the general course that I recommended, a discussion of
units, quantities, proportions, graphic presentation (in brief, descriptive
statistics), cases, the meaning and distortions of incidents, the use of anecdotes,
and the like, which would make students more critical of the various means of communi-
cation.
J. ¥. Albig
Cooperation in the social sciences, as elsewhere always runs back to individuals.
It implies people of good-will and friendly spirit working together for ends which
they deem worthwhile. In short, cooperation rests primarily on a willingness to
cooperate. We are fortunate in this University . The social science group is
friendly, although not very well acquainted. Perhaps we do not have to be especially
well acquainted in ordor to cooperate; but certainly we must be willing to become
more closely associated if we are to work together successfully.
Seven of the departments concerned with the social sciences have already had
experience in cooperation through association in the Division of the Social Sciences
which is now near the end of its eighth year. A good many uses have been found for
this organization which were not contemplated when it was founded. The Division,
through the Divisional Committee, has been able to facilitate the adjustment of a
number of matters which might oterwise have caused some interdepartmental friction.
Many of the matters considered by the Divisional Committee have been referred to it
by the Committee on College Policy of Liberal Arts and Sciences, by the Provost, and
by the President. Since none of the Departments have withdrawn in anger, it may be
said that this attempt at cooperation has been successful.
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At present, the Divisional Committee, through a sub
-committee, is considering
a plan to enable students to gain a better understanding of international affairs
through selection of courses in several departments but within the limits of present
departmental requirements. Although this is a small matter, it represents a
willingness to move towards a desired end by working together.
There is at present no general social science. That there ever can be a
general social science is doubtful. It would rest on laws more general, more funda-
mental, than those which lie at the base of the several social disciplines as we
know them, and would approach the solution of problems which at present are rarely,
if ever, presented. No general synthesis of the social sciences is at present
possible; because, to borrow a phrase, "Synthesis must be purposive to some ulterior
end". The "ulterior end" of the social process is at present but dimly seen, if
seen at all. However, it is possible, since all aspects of social life are closely
connected, to combine the wisdom of two or more of the social sciences in an approach
to the solution of a particular problem. Therein lies the Justification and desir-
ability of cooperation among the departments of the social sciences.
It seems to me that the time has passed when the departments of the social
sciences can exist as separate, independent educational entities. Probably no such
tine ever was; but when the offerings of each department were standardized, and
when expansion meant merely the splitting off of bits of the general courses for
special study, we could remain very nearly self-sufficient. But the pressures of
the times, the possible increase in the number of students, the recent social changes,
the shift of emphasis from general to specialized education, and the condition of
the world likely to obtain at the end of this war make it likely that the social
sciences must rearrange their courses and readjust their requirements to fit the
needs of the future. It seems to me that the job can be done better if it is done
cooperatively. Let me illustrate in a modest way the kind of thing I mean.
There seems to be a growing interest in the relations between the United States
and the countries of Central and South America. There are courses dealing with these
countries in both Geography and History. A course in Latin American Culture is given
under the supervision of the Division of the Social Sciences. It is likely that
this later course will find permanent lodgement in some regularly organized depart-
ment of the University. But there is no adequate provision for the study of our
relations with Latin America in Political Science, Sociology, or Economics. It
may well be that it is neither desirable nor expedient for all departments to give
time to this problem; but it does seem that what is done can be done better if there
is consultation and mutual adjustment than if every department goes at the matter
independently without much knowledge of what the other departments are doing or
propose to do.
At present there is a course in the sociology of the region, and there are
regional courses in Geography. Perhaps also some of the History courses could be
so characterized. There seems to be a growing interest in the regional approach.
Ought some of our courses in Economics to be regrouped and developed on a regional
basis?
In the first of these discussions, Professor Goble raised a question about the
training of administrators. I do not know how administrators should be trained;
but I am convinced that it is not the work of any one department. Neither is it
likely that all administrators require the same training. Perhaps a group of more
or loss integrated courses which make possible some flexibility of program is the
beBt way that can be found at present.
Cooperation for the settlement of problems of the kinds I have mentioned should
be informal and flexible. I suggest occasional conferences of department heads,
preferably before rather than after action is taken, to consider matters of departmenta
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development and to exchange ideas. It does not follow that because a program seems
desirable it can be put into effect immediately. When new courses are to be given,
usually new men must be found, and there is always the budget. Since no department
can do everything it wants to do, it seems that some aid in making a selection
among the possibilities could be gotten from consultation with other department
heads. This arrangement should be flexible in another way. Some of the problems
would be of interest to one group of departments, some to another. It is because
informality and flexibility seem to me desirable that I am not proposing that these
matters be put through the Divisional Committee.
I have never had direct experience either in organizing or in giving a coopera-
tive course. I have examined some of the syllabi which have been prepared for such
courses. It seems to me that Professor Griffith's criticism that such courses tend
to fall apart is justified. A combined course in economics and sociology is likely
to become a brief course in economics followed by a brief course in sociology.
The purposes of the course are likely to remain departmental oven though it is
given as a general course. The suggestion that such a course be based on a few
ideas or concepts which are of general social importance is excellent as to ends;
but is likely to present some difficulties as to material. We have studied society
so long from a departmental viewpoint that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
integrate the material so that it is interesting and instructive.
Cooperative courses which are organized around problems may be both valuable
and interesting. However, it is difficult to give such courses to largo numbers of
students. If the group is small enough so that the course can be conducted as a
seminar or conference it may be made extremely valuable, and may draw together the
interests of several fields. But the large course, which must be given in several
more or less coordinated sections, must of necessity, be a rather formal affair.
It can be a series of lectures, though our students generally are not receptive to
lecture presentation; but it is hardly possible to give to a series of lectures the
informality desirable in a discussion of current problems.
Altogether, it seems likely that the social sciences will continue as independent
disciplines. But a friendly exchange of ideas, and, perhaps, some experimentation
with new approaches may lead to a better integration of social science studies than
we have at present.
Pembroke H. Brown
"Cooperation" is one of those agreeable words to which we are all inclined to
react with feelings of warmth and approval. Were I therefore to devote my time
this evening to the praise of cooperation, to arguing the general case that there
should be interdepartmental cooperation in the social sciences at the University of
Illinois, it is fairly certain that there would be a great amount of agreement among
us all. We could agree that such cooperation is desirable, that "every effort
should be made", as the banal phrase goes, to secure more of it and so on; and
having sung our hymns in praise of cooperation, and having enjoyed our mutual feeling
of agreement, we might part, returning each to his special work in teaching and
research, leaving the state and the promise of cooperative work among these fields
just about where it was before the celebration started.
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I want very much to avoid spending our time in this way. Such festivals, like
the cheering and the athletic rallies of the undergraduates, probably have in their
season some useful function. But there comes a time when some of us, at least,
become tired of hearing kind words spoken in favor of interdepartmental cooperation
when there is little indication that these are meant to be anything more than kind
words, and their significance therefore is to be compared with those other ceremonial
expressions of praise which custom requires of us when we speak of the dead. In an
effort to avoid this kind of discussion of the subject I propose to limit this paper
on interdepartmental cooperation in the social sciences in two primary ways. First,
instead of arguing the case for such cooperation, I shall assume that we do agree
to a considerable extent that -such cooperation is a good thing for the departments
concerned and for the University as a whole, and that the University of Illinois is
markedly deficient in its performance in this respect. Proceeding from this assumed
agreement I shall consider some concrete steps which may be taken to secure more of
this cooperation, in the hope that by translating the discussion from the language
of generalities to that of particular proposals we may be able to see more clearly
how far actually we do agree and how far we are willing to implement our agreement
with practical action. Secondly, instead of attempting to discuss all the various
ways in which departments may cooperate with each other in teaching, in research,
in social relations, and so on, I shall concentrate my remarks upon the one kind of
cooperation in which, though it is of first importance to the University as an
institution of learning, we appear to be most deficient. This is intellectual
cooperation among the faculty; cooperation in study and research; in mutual sugges-
tion and criticism, and in the general interchange of ideas.
Granting, therefore, that cooperation of this kind is valuable, and that we of
the University of Illinois greatly need to improve our condition in this respect,
how can we set about doing so? It is important for us to remember, before consider-
ing any reforms in our academic practice, that there are limits to tbe spheres in
which this cooperation yields results of value commensurate with the effort it requires.
There are many areas of investigation within the social studies, as in other discip-
lines, in which much of the work to be done appears to be the kind which can be
done most efficiently by research-workers in that one field, where they are relatively
free to carry on their own studies, in their own tradition and with their own methods,
without advice or assistance from investigators in other fields. And there are
also many scholars to whom such work is most appealing, who wish to concentrate and
who do their best in the kind of research where interdepartmental considerations are
of small or negligible value. Provisions for securing intellectual cooperation in
the social studies should recognize this difference between kinds of work and kinds
of worker, and while they ensure the increased realization of cooperation in those
areas where research in the various departments is genuinely interdependent and where
the interchange of criticism and ideas is of great value, they should also not prejudice
the right of privacy of research, as it were, right of those individuals who wish to
do so to continue in the kind of investigation which can best be done entirely within
one field of study. There is, of course, in our present situation but the remotest
danger of the violation of such rights; yet it would be a sad miscarriage of good
intentions if in a sudden zeal for cooperation we should institute arrangements
which would exert pressure for cooperative study upon individuals who have little
taste or perhaps capacity for such and in whose fields of investigation the benefits
of such study may be relatively unimportant.
Supposing, on the other hand, that there are individuals in the Social Studies
who sincerely desire and whose work would profit by interdepartmental cooperation
of an intellectual kind, it remains to consider what arrangements might be instituted
which would assist realizing this desire and achieving the profit. One of our
neighbor universities, the University of Chicago, has recently adopted a new curriculum
for graduate students in the social studies which may be worth brief mention hero,
for although the provisions of this curriculum are primarily provisions for graduate
education, the kind of graduate education given in a university is closely connected
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with tho kind of intellectual work flourishing in that place. The new curriculum
involves the establishment of a new field for graduate study called the field of
"Social Thought," and with this a fairly elaborate scheme for combining graduate
study in this new field with study in the traditional social fields and in closely
related groups of these fields. Organized about this new field of study are curricula
leading to two new degrees offered under the supervision of a Committee on Social
Thought: a Master's degree and a Doctor's degree, each in Social Thought. The field
of Social Thought is itself under the direction of an Executive Committee on Social
Thought, "together with" in the words of a memorandum of the committee "other members
of the Faculty having philosophical and aesthetic interests". The present personnel
of the Executive Committee is President Robert M. Hutchins, Dean Robert Redfield \
of the Division of Social Sciences, Frank H. Knight, Professor of Social Science, \
and John U. Nef , Professor of Economic History and Executive Secretary. As a
field of study Social Thought is considered as embracing the following interrelated
subjects: (l) "the problems involved in the rational choice of ends and means" in
society; (2) "the problem of history", including both what has traditionally been
called the "philosophy of history" and the study of historical method, and (3) "the
comparative and generalized study of societies."
Graduate students who are candidates for degrees in Social Thought are not
required to do major work in this particular field of study, but they are lr required
to include it among their studies either as a major or a minor. These students are
expected to continue their graduate study approximately one year longer, either for
the Master's or for the Doctor's degree, than students preparing for the equivalent
degrees in the traditional social studies. The candidate for the Doctor's degree in
Social Thought, to take but one specific example, is required to do major work in
either Social Thought or in one of the following four combined fields: (a) Anthropol-
ogy and Sociology; (b) Politics, Economics, Jurisprudence, and Ethics; (c) Education,
Psychology, and Human Development; and (d) Far Eastern Civilizations. For his minor
fields he may choose two fields, either from among this total of five or from five
other broadly defined fields of historical research.
This description of the Chicago innovations is certainly too brief to convey
to one hearing about them for the first time a clear idea of their nature . However it
may serve to suggest certain reasons why they deserve the study of our Committee of
tho Social Sciences, although they may in the end turn out to be not the kind of
arrangements which we at Illinois would wish for ourselves. They are worthy of
study because they are an attempt to devise arrangements better adapted than those
now prevalent to producing scholars and teachers broadly and deeply versed in the
social studies. Since my knowledge of this whole program is second-hand, being
limited to that which can be derived from the memoranda of tho Committee on Social
Thought and its Executive Secretary, I cannot with any great assurance pass judgment
upon its merits. I should expect, however, that a careful examination would reveal
it to be not suitable to any great extent for emulation by the University of Illinois.
For, in the first place, it does not appear to take advantage of the great opportun-
ities for cooperative research and more general study available under the more
traditional schemes of graduate work in the social sciences. Neglecting these
opportunities it proceeds to set up new means for securing what may be secured just
as well, or bettor, if the means already available will only be employed. The most
striking example of this extravagant duplication of instruments is the establish-
ment of the field called "Social Thought'.' Being myself a philosopher I may naturally
be prejudiced, but I cannot see the desirability of setting up a new field of study
for doing the same sort of thing which is already being done, and will under the
program presumably continue to be done, under the more traditional title of "social
philosophy"
•
In the second place, the successful embarkation upon an educational program of
this sort seems to presuppose upon the part of the faculty involved some considerable
capacity to cooperate intellectually in the fields of social study; and this, in our
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situation at the University of Illinois, would "be a premature assumption to make.
As a first step in achieving and demonstrating such capacity some more modest pro-
gram, though less novel and striking than the institution of new fields of study and
new advanced degrees, would seem more promising. The main item in such a program,
the biggest single step toward securing intellectual cooperation in the social sci-
ences, would he, I believe, the institution of interdepartmental seminars upon
problems and phases of these studies in which the areas of investigation intersect
and whore the achievement of reliable results depends upon considerations affecting
more than one field*
Various topics immediately come to mind when one considers possible subjects
in which both research and the training of graduate students would profit by serious
interdepartmental study and discussion. The whole question of method in the social
studies, which has become increasingly live and pressing in recent years, is one
with many facets, scarcely any of which can be treated thoroughly in departmental
isolation. Consider for example the movement called "operationalism", which is a
variant of the tradition of empiricism in philosophy, which was first formulated
by an experimental physicist, and which is now the center of a vigorous methodologi-
cal dispute in such fields of the social sciences as psychology and sociology. A
somewhat less well-known example, though just as wide in its implications and
perhaps of more lasting importance, is the type of view and study which has come to
be known as the "sociology of knowledge" . This subject has been investigated under
the above title chiefly by sociologists and philosophers, but it is fundamentally
similar to certain views expressed and argued under a different name by other students
of social matters, including some of our most eminent historians. A third and
final example is the host of problems, in logic and metaphysics and ethics, in the
philosophy of history, in sociology, in economics, in political theory and in
practical policy, which are most interestingly and intricately combined in the system
of thought of Marx and Engels, and their later followers and interpreters. Regardless
of one's political persuasion, it is hardly possible at the present time to doubt
the value and the need of securing and promulgating clear and true ideas concerning
the matters embraced in this last example.
It is no reflection upon the successful conduct of the two undergraduate courses
on the War and on Latin American Civilization by the Social Science Division that
it should be recommended here that the kind of seminars here proposed be given by
groups of departments, and not by the Division itself. These seminars require a
much greater concentration of subject matter, responsibility, and interest, than
general seminars given by the Division would afford. Each seminar should be listed
as an offering by all the departments from which members of the faculty are enlisted
for its conduct; and each would normally be counted as contributing to either a
major or a minor in any one of these same fields of study.
Seminars like this will fell to arouse the kind of intellectual cooperation for
which they are designed to the extent to which they are regarded as extra-curricular
activities in which any one may engage, if he wishes, so long as it does not inter-
fere with the regular work for which he has been engaged by the University. Exper-
ience with extra-curricular ventures in this direction in the past indicates that
the kind of serious and prolonged effort which is required in the successful manage-
ment of such projects is too much to expect of individuals who already have a full
program of teaching and research and who receive no alleviation of this load in
compensation for the additional work which their participation in these projects
extracts from them. For this reason it is essential to the success of these seminars
that the time and effort expended by members of the various departments in partici-
pating in them shall be regarded as a part of their regular load of university work.
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One further item of administrative practice which seems highly important for
the successful execution of this program concerns the location of the responsibility
for Judging the qualifications of members of the faculty to participate in the con-
duct of the seminars. The primary responsibility for deciding whether a man is
equipped to assist in any given seminar should lie with the individuals and groups
most directly affected by the success of the seminar, namely, the departments which
offer it, the Committee in charge of the Division of the Social Sciences, and the
Dean of the Graduate School. If therefore any faculty member is designated by his
department, by the other departments offering the seminar, and by these administrative
officials, as qualified to participate in a seminar, the presumption should be that
the agencies best prepared to judge his scholarship have passed upon him, and that
only the most exceptional circumstances would warrant a question of that decision
by other administration committees who may be in no position to appraise his scholar-
ship except on the rather external grounds of the number of words he has published
or the accident, if I may so term it, of his academic rank. Arrangements of this
kind seem required if this program is to take advantage of the enthusiasm and the
ideas of any able younger men on the faculty of the social sciences who either are
left to the University by the demands of war, or are returned to it with the demobili-
zation.
I have assumed that there is some genuine desire to increase intellectual
cooperation between the various departments in our social studies; I have pointed out
that subjects suitable and crying for such cooperation are readily available; and I
have argued that certain limited changes, and no very profound ones, are required in
order to proceed to realize this desire. In closing now, a few words concerning the
first steps to be taken in instituting such a program may be in order. The general
failure of our departments to realize such cooperation as even present conditions
make possible suggests that some special measures will have to be taken to break
down their traditional isolation, to lure what capacity for intellectual cooperation
may be available out of its shy retirement behind departmental walls. Perhaps the
best and most direct means to this end would be for the Committee in Charge of the
Social Studies to proceed, either by itself or by a sub -committee, to canvas with
the various departments the possibilities in the way of such seminars which these
departments are willing to exploit, the subjects which appear fruitful, and the
individuals who are available for participation in them. It remains to be demon-
strated, and this first step should be helpful in the matter, whether our desire
for intellectual cooperation is as strong as we say it is, and whether we have the
personnel capable of making a program like this a profitable venture. It may possibly
be revealed at once that our deficiencies in either one of these respects are too
great to permit the achievement of intellectual cooperation by the means which have
been here proposed. But if these means will not succeed, it is hard to imagine
what will.
Frederick L. Will





